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ABSTRACT 
This article interrogates the constitutional relevance of African social ordering rules 
in petroleum governance in Sub-Saharan African petroleum producing states. At the apex of 
the hierarchized African legal system is the national constitution which contains the basic norm 
or grundnorm derived from Western received law. Yet some African scholars have described 
African social ordering norms as grundnorms. This goes contrary to the conventional positivist 
position that ‘a legal system cannot be founded on two conflicting grundnorms.’ 2 This article 
will consider whether African social ordering norms have actually attained the level of a 
grundnorm as expounded in Kelsen’s pure theory. Utilising the Ekeh’s ‘two publics’ model, it 
investigates how the basic norm for African social ordering grundnorms is presupposed. 
 
The article considers whether there is a conflict between the domanial system of state 
ownership as approved by African national constitutions and indigenous African social 
ordering norms premised on communitarianism. The article presents for analysis the recent 
study undertaken by African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA). This study considers 
whether it is possible to standardise the rules of petroleum contractual governance in Africa. 
This has led to some discussion on whether the standardisation of these rules could lead to the 
development of an African Lex Petrolea. This article explores the role that African social 
ordering norms can play in the development of a continent-wide Lex Petrolea. 
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PART 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The grundnorm is described as the fundamental or ‘foundation’ rule that underpins a legal 
system.3 In many post-colonial African states, the grundnorm is presented in the national 
constitution, the supreme law of an African hierarchical legal system.4  The typical hierarchical 
African legal system is a pluralist system. It consists of Western received law which operate 
side by side with non-Western norms and rules. These non-Western norms and rules are 
described as African social ordering grundnorms.5  
The status of these indigenous social ordering ‘grundnorms’ in the hierarchized legal 
systems of post-colonial African states is in debate. Chigara, in his leading work6, describes 
these social ordering rules as grundnorms. He offers very limited evidence on how these rules 
have attained the presupposed status of a grundnorm as required in Kelsen's pure theory. In 
contrast, it is presupposed that the national constitution of an African democratic state 
embodies the grundnorm or foundation rule. 7  A conflict of norms will arise if it is agreed that 
African social ordering norms have attained the status of a grundnorm. This will contradict the 
positivist approach which holds that ‘a system founded on the Grundnorm cannot allow for 
two equally valid norms to contradict each other as this would threaten the unity of the 
system.’8 
    Following Kelsen’s theory of pure law, the validity of the basic norm is premised on a 
presupposition exercise.9 This exercise is linked to the concept of efficacy where the 
grundnorm is presupposed as the highest law because it is followed and obeyed. This of course 
raises the question on why people follow and obey the basic law and treat it as the highest 
norm. The positivist school will point to sovereign power or to the will of the people.10  The 
national constitution is established by the will of the people as the supreme law of the land.11    
                                                 
3 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Translation from the Second German Edition by Max Knight. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967. x)  356 pp. Reprinted 2005 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd; Trevor 
Hartley, ‘National Law, International Law and EU Law- How do they Relate?’ in  Patrick Capps, Malcolm 
Evans, (eds) Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2003) 67. 
4 Richard Oppong, Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 208 
5 Ben Chigara, ‘The Humwe Principle: A Social-Ordering Grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa’ in Robert 
Home (eds) Essays in African Land Law (Pretoria University Law Press, 2011) 113. 
6 Ibid. See 113, 120 where he describes Humwe as a new social ordering grundnorm. 
7 Oppong (n 3) 208. 
8 Panos Merkouris,  Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration (BRILL, 2015) 167. 
9 Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm?: A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine (Kluwer International, 
2002) 19. 
10 Ibid  
11 Donald Dahlin, We the People: A Brief Introduction to the Constitution and its Interpretation (Springer, 
2012) Chapter three 
  
       There are drawbacks to this position. This is because of the existence of 'two publics' in 
post-colonial African states. Ekeh presents a seminal discourse12 on these two key publics.  
These two publics are the ‘civic public’ and the ‘primordial public'.13 The civic public consists 
of the Westphalian state and its structures while the primordial public consists of families and 
ethnic groupings. The claim is that Africans pay more allegiance to the ‘primordial public’ than 
to the ‘civic public.’ 14While there has been some criticism15 on Ekeh’s ‘two publics’ theory, 
it does provide some context on why some local communities within an African sovereign state 
find it difficult to accept the national constitution as the foundational norm on community 
matters. Utilising Ekeh’s two publics theory, this article will explore whether recurring 
resource conflicts in some African oil producing states is due to the insistence of the amoral 
African state that its national constitution should be regarded as the fundamental norm for 
petroleum governance. It considers whether oil resource conflicts can be resolved by affording 
greater legitimacy to indigenous social ordering norms that primordial communities can 
identify with.  
     To address these issues, the article is organised in the following manner. Part one of this 
article provides the introductory context. Part two focuses on the legal governance of petroleum 
resources in Sub- Saharan African states.  Part three of the article considers the construction 
and development of the African social ordering grundnorm. Part four considers the merits and 
demerits of developing an African Lex Petrolea based on indigenous social ordering norms. 
Part five provides the concluding remarks of the article.  
 
PART TWO 
 
2. LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
Petroleum Ownership Structures 
 Legal governance of petroleum resources in Sub-Saharan Africa has its roots in the 
continent’s colonial legacy. The constitutions of most petroleum producing African states vests 
                                                 
12 Peter Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’ (1975) 17(1) Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 91-112. 
13 Ibid 92. 
14 Ibid 107-108. 
15 Brown Onouha ‘Publishing postcolonial Africa: Nigeria and Ekeh’s two publics a generation after' 
(2014) 40(2) Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies 322-337. 
  
ownership of petroleum resources with the state based on the domanial system of ownership. 
Petroleum ownership structures are generally based on Regalian and Domanial systems. The 
Roman based regalian system entitles the sovereign to exercise dominium directum (dominion 
over the soil) and to assume ownership over minerals extracted from the soil. The regalian 
system also recognises a separate subsidiary right known as dominium utile (the right to profit 
and use of soil).16 Hepburn17 claims that the regalian system of dominium directum is 
integrated into the domanial system. Under this system,  ownership of petroleum resources in 
the soil and within the sub-soil is vested with the sovereign state. An examination of the legal 
systems of post-colonial African states establishes that many of these states operate the 
domanial system of petroleum ownership. In the domanial system of ownership structure, 
petroleum resources in strata is exclusively vested in the State. Table 1 below provides a case 
study of the Sub-Saharan African member countries of the African Petroleum Producers 
Association (APPA).18  This table illustrates that most APPA countries practice the domanial 
legal systems of ownership within their constitutional and state law framework. The North 
African APPA countries have been excluded from this table due to the fact that the focus of 
this article is legal governance in Sub-Saharan African oil producing countries. 
 
Table1: Legal Ownership of Petroleum Resources in APPA Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
African Oil 
Producing 
States 
Region Legal Framework on 
Ownership 
Ownership  
Structure 
Constitutional and 
Statutory 
Provisions 
Angola 
 
 
Southern Africa Constitution of Angola 2010 Domanial The preamble of the 
2010 Constitution 
vests ownership in 
the State. 
                                                 
16Samantha Hepburn, Mining and Energy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 11. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The APPA is an Inter-Governmental and Collaborative Association of African Petroleum Producing States 
(AAPA). See www.aapa.int/en/pres/ . 
South Africa  Southern Africa  Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 
 
 Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 
of 2002 (“MPRDA) 
Domanial Section 24 of the 
Constitution requires 
the natural resources 
should be developed 
in an ecological 
sustainable manner. 
The MPRDA vests 
ownership of mineral  
and petroleum 
resources in the 
nation of South 
Africa and the 
Minister of Natural 
Resources. 
 
  
Equatorial 
Guinea 
West Africa Decree Law No. 8/2006 of 
November 2006 (Hydrocarbons 
Law) and Petroleum Regulation 
of the Republic of Equatorial 
Guinea Num. 4/2013 (Petroleum 
Regulation). 
Domanial Decree Law No. 
8/2006 of November 
2006 (Hydrocarbons 
Law) and Petroleum 
Regulation of the 
Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea 
Num. 4/2013 
(Petroleum 
Regulation). 
Ghana  West Africa Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic of Ghana 
(Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 
527) 
Domanial Article 257(6) of the 
1996 Constitution 
states that minerals in 
their natural state as 
property of the state.   
Nigeria – West 
Africa 
West Africa The 1999 Constitution of 
Nigeria and the Nigerian 
Petroleum Act 1969. 
Domanial S.44 (3) of the  
Constitution and the 
Nigerian Petroleum 
Act 1969 vests oil 
and gas resources in 
the Federal 
Government of 
Nigeria. 
Benin West Africa Petroleum Code of 2006 -18. Domanial Article 3 of the Code 
separates the deposits 
of liquid and gaseous 
hydrocarbons from 
the ownership of 
land. It regards these 
deposits as public 
property that belongs 
to the nation.  
Cameroon West Africa Constitution of the Republic of 
Cameroon 1996 as amended by 
Law No 2008/001 and  
Law No. 99/013 of 22 
December 1999,  
instituting the Petroleum code 
(the  
Petroleum Code). 
Domanial Article 21 of the 
Constitution 
endorses charter 
rights that vests all 
peoples with rights to 
freely dispose of their 
wealth and resources. 
The Constitution is 
silent on who owns 
petroleum resources.  
 
Article 3 of the 
Petroleum Code 1999 
provides for state 
ownership of all 
deposits or natural 
accumulations of 
hydrocarbons and 
treats these deposits 
as the exclusive 
property of the 
Cameroonian state.  
  
Chad West Africa Chad’s Constitution of 1996 
with amendments through 2005. 
 
Law no. 006/PR/2007 dated 20 
April  
2007 on hydrocarbons, as 
amended and  
supplemented by Ordinance no. 
001/ 
PR/2010 dated September 30, 
2010 and Decree no. 
796/PR/PM/MPE/2010 dated  
September 30, 2010 
implementing the  
Hydrocarbons Law.  
 
Domanial Article 57 of the 
Constitution vests the 
State with permanent 
sovereignty over all 
the national natural 
resources for the 
well- being of the 
national community.  
 
Article 2.1 of the 
Hydrocarbon Laws 
vests hydrocarbons in 
their natural state to 
the Republic of Chad. 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Middle/Central 
Africs 
Congo (the Democratic 
Republic of the) Constitution of 
2005 with amendments up to 
2011. 
 
The Petroleum Law (Law No. 
15/012 dated 1 August 2015) 
Domanial Article 9 of the 
Constitution provides 
for permanent 
sovereignty over 
natural resources 
with the state. 
Republic of 
Congo (RoC) 
Middle/Central 
Africa 
Congo’s Constitution of 2001 
 
Law no 24-94 dated 23 August 
1994 (Petroleum Code), Decree 
no 2008-15 dated 11 February 
2008 (Attribution Code). 
Domanial The Constitution is 
silent on ownership. 
The state is vested 
with ownership of 
hydrocarbons in the 
Congolese soil and 
sub-soil. 
Cote D’Ivoire West Africs Cote D’Ivoire Constitution 2000 
 
The Petroleum Code of Côte 
d’Ivoire, instituted by Law N° 
96-669 of August 29, 1996.  
 
Ordinance N° 2012-369 of 
April 18, 2012, amending Law 
N° 96-669 of August 29, 1996 
establishing the Petroleum 
Code.  
 
Decree N° 96-733 of September 
19, 1996, laying down general 
rules for the application of the 
law on the Petroleum Code. 
Domanial The Constitution is 
silent on ownership 
of Petroleum 
resources. 
 
Mineral rights in oil 
and gas are vested in 
the state by the 
Petroleum Code 
which state 
ownership of natural 
hydrocarbon deposits 
and accumulations.  
 
Gabon Central/Middle 
Africa 
Gabon’s Constitution of 1991 
with amendments through 1997. 
 
 
Hydrocarbons Law (Law No. 
11/2014 of August 28 2014).  
Domanial The Gabon 
Constitution does not 
expressly discuss 
ownership of 
petroleum resources. 
 
The Hydrocarbons 
Law vests ownership 
of petroleum 
resources with the 
state. 
  
Mauritania West Africa Mauritania’s Constitution of 
1991 with amendments through 
2012. 
 
Act No. 2008-011 on the 
Mining Code (27 April 2008). 
 
Ordinance No. 2002-005 
regulating the activities of the 
downstream oil sector (28 
March 2002). 
Domanial The Mauritanian 
Constitution does not 
expressly set out 
provisions on 
ownership of natural 
resources.  
 
The Mining Code 
states that deposits 
are separate from 
land ownership. It 
vest ownership of 
these deposits in the 
state.  
Niger West Africa Niger’s Constitution of 2010. 
 
Petroleum Code Act No 2007- 
01. 
Domanial Article 149 of the 
Constitution provides 
state sovereignty 
over natural 
resources and the 
sub-soil.  
 
 
 
 
The domanial system of state ownership derives its legitimacy from the constitutional 
framework in a petroleum producing state. 19While the state is the owner of petroleum 
resources in strata, the exploitation of petroleum resources is undertaken on a collaborative 
basis with multinational companies (MNCs). This is because many African states lack risk 
capital and the required technical know-how for the exploitation of oil and gas resources. Under 
the domanial system, the state will grant MNCs the right to exploit petroleum resources through 
a host state agreement (HSA). There are different models of the HSAs, but the most common 
types utilised in Sub-Saharan Africa are the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs), the 
modern Oil Concessions and Service Contracts (SCs) respectively.20 The PSA and SCs are well 
suited for domanial systems of petroleum governance due to the fact that the MNCs acts as a 
contractor for the State. Unlike the modern Oil Concession where the MNC can claim 
ownership of produced oil at the wellhead, the MNC has no legal title to produced oil under 
the PSA and SC. The PSA does permit the MNC to participate with a State Owned Company 
(SOC) or National Oil Company (NOC) in a stream of oil revenue known as profit oil.  
   The state constitution and petroleum legislation regulate these contracts alongside with rules 
of international investment law. This establishes the pluralist nature of petroleum governance 
                                                 
19 Ibid 11-12. 
20 Emmanuel Laryea, 'Contractual Arrangements for Resource Investment' in Francis Botchway (eds) Natural 
Resource Investment and African Development (Edward Elgar, 2011) 108 -116. 
  
in African oil producing states. It is instructive that within this pluralist system, there appears 
to be no place for African social ordering rules. The exclusion of indigenous rules from the 
pluralist petroleum legal system raises some concerns. This is because the exploitation of 
petroleum resources is undertaken in indigenous oil producing communities. Ekeh's ‘two 
publics’ theory shows that these communities adhere more to the dictates of the customary 
rules developed by the 'primordial public,' than to state law which is developed by the 'civic 
public'.21   
      There is some concern that HSA contracts are executed between amoral civic state and 
MNCs without the direct involvement of local communities.22 The bilateral nature of these 
contracts is premised on state sovereignty over petroleum resources. Equally, MNCs provide 
the necessary risk capital to secure the contractual bargain of these contracts. In contrast, the 
local oil producing communities which bear the brunt of oil and gas exploitation are not 
contractual parties to these HSAs. Table 1 above shows that control and management of natural 
resources is constitutionally vested in the national state. Local communities are therefore not 
considered as having the necessary constitutional standing to participate in HSAs. This is an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs and is a contributory factor for the resource conflicts that take 
place within these communities .23  
 
Oil Producing Communities and the Right to Self-Determination  
    In contrast, under International Law, local communities can exercise qualified sovereignty 
and self-determination over their natural resources. These rights are set out in international 
instruments such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources24  which embodies the right of sovereign states and their 
peoples to exercise sovereignty over their resources.25 The 2007 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides indigenous peoples with the rights to self 
determination and participation in the decision making process over their natural resources. 
The 2007 Declaration however does not vest indigenous peoples with 'expressis verbis with 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources or entails exclusive rights for 
                                                 
21 Ekeh (n 12) 198. 
22 Hephzibah Egede and Edwin Egede, 'The Force of the Community in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Propositions 
for New Oil and Gas Legal and Contractual Arrangements (2016) 25 Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1-37 (Forthcoming). This current article is a follow-up to this work. 
23Abiodun Alao, Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment (University of 
Rochester Press, 2007) 170-198. 
24 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
25 Ibid para 1. 
  
indigenous peoples over the natural resources within their territories.'26 It does however provide 
these communities with participatory or consultative rights in the decision making process over 
the management and control over natural resources.  Article 32 of the Declaration requires 
states to undertake bona- fide consultations and cooperation initiatives with their indigenous 
communities before undertaking or engaging with projects that may impact on their lands and 
resources.  Article  46(1) stipulates that the conferment of the right to self-determination under 
this Declaration should not be construed as: 
 
     ' authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in        
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.' 
 
      This establishes that the right to self-determination as provided in Article 4 is confined to 
the participatory rights set out in Articles 25-28 of the Declaration. It does not entitle 
communities to secede or assert political independence outside the sovereign states in which 
they are situated. Article 21(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights27 also 
entitles African peoples with the right to: 
 
    '... freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the 
exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.' 
      
     The right of African peoples to exercise self determination over their wealth and resources 
has been deliberated upon by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. In the  
decided cases of Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria28 and Endorois v. Kenya29, the Commission 
affirmed the obligation of states to respect and protect the rights granted to African peoples 
under the Charter.  
       In the Endorois' case, the Commission specifically affirmed that Kenya should have 
obtained the Endorois community's 'free, prior, and informed consent, according to their 
                                                 
26 Nicolaas Schrijver, 'Self-determination of Peoples and Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources' in 
Realising the Right of Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Right to Development (United Nations, 2013) 99. 
 
 
 
27Adopted in Nairobi June 27, 1981. Entered into Force October 21, 1986. 
28 Communication No. 155/96, 2001. 
29 Communication No. 276/2003. 
  
customs and traditions'30  before undertaking development projects within their territory. This 
decision highlights the role that African 'social ordering' rules can play in natural resource 
governance. It further underscores Ekeh's claims that many Africans  simultaneously live and 
function within the 'primordial' and 'civic publics'. This is why it is important to consider the 
relevance of African 'social ordering rules'  in  petroleum governance. 
 
PART THREE 
 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL ORDERING GRUND-NORM IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA? 
 
The Mixed African Legal System of Governance in Norm Formulation 
The use of received Western Law in the legal systems of many African states is a legacy 
of colonialism. Menski31 explains that these received rules are derived from the legal systems 
of other countries. He argues that involuntary imposition of these rules has created a cultural 
conflict between Western received law and the indigenous rules of post-colonial states.32 As 
previously stated, many African states have adopted the system known as legal pluralism to 
resolve the conflict between Western received Law and indigenous rules. The seminal work of 
Griffiths33 establishes that there are weak and strong constructions of the concept of legal 
pluralism. The weak construction of legal pluralism is a system where the state sanctions or 
permits the operation of multiple legal systems within its jurisdictional sphere. The difficulty 
with the weak construction of legal pluralism is that the civic state has the final say on the rules 
that apply in its legal system. Griffiths therefore views the weak construction of legal pluralism 
as a form of legal centralism since it is still reliant on the concept of a hierarchy of rules where 
state law has pre-eminence. Conversely, the strong construction of legal pluralism discredits 
the purist positivist construction of law which focuses on a ‘single, unified and exclusive 
hierarchical normative ordering depending from the power of the state.’34 Rather, Griffith 
argues that the strong construction of legal pluralism envisions a system where multiple bodies 
of rules can operate within a decentralised system. 
 
                                                 
30Ibid, para 291. 
31 Menski (n 2) 126. 
32 Ibid. 
33 John Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism? ' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 5. 
34 Ibid. 
  
It is debatable if African states actually practise the strong construction of legal pluralism. It 
appears that the mixed African legal systems of most African states is premised on a hierarchy 
of rules where the state constitution is situated at the apex of the system. This hierarchised 
system which prioritises Western received law above customary law creates  the cultural 
conflict described in Menski's work35. Arguably, the modernisation theory has played a role in 
the prioritisation of Western received law above African customary law. This is because it 
requires that Africa follow in the 'developmental footsteps of Europe (largely the former 
colonizer of Africa).'36 Notwithstanding the role that the modernisation theory has played in 
the development of the African civic public and in its formation of legal rules, 
the Endorois decision underscores the continuing importance of African customary law.            
Within this customary framework, Chigara37 argues that there are fundamental social ordering 
rules or norms which can be regarded as African grundnorms. This is because the primordial 
public pre-supposes them to be so. He further claims that these ‘ancient social ordering’ rules 
predate colonialism and were presupposed by Africans as the foundational rules that governed 
pre-colonial African communities. He however does not provide definitive evidence on how 
these specific norms attained the revered status of  'grundnorm'  except to point to their 
historical relevance and applicability continent-wide. 
    Chigara presents Humwe (a Shona concept) as an example of an indigenous social ordering 
grundnorm. The term is defined as ‘in this together’ or ‘us all.' It can be described as African 
communitarianism or interdependence. He further argues that there are similar African norms 
and points to the popular Zulu concept 'Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu' (abridged as Ubuntu- 
People are people through people) and to Umoja, a Swahili term for communal unity. His 
research also identifies similar norms in other parts of Africa including West Africa. Ramose, 
in his leading African philosophical text, argues that indigenous norms such as Ubuntu are 
important because they stem from ‘the wellspring flowing from African ontology and 
epistemology.' He further argues that they apply continent wide because of the ‘philosophical 
affinity and kinship between the indigenous people of Africa’38 It is however unclear if this 
'affinity and kinship' of African peoples is the determining consideration for the claim that 
these rules have attained the status of grundnorms.  
                                                 
35 Menski (n 2) 126. 
36 Jephias Matunhu, 'A Critique of Modernisation and Dependency Theories in Africa: Critical Assessment' 
(2011) 3(5) Journal of History and Culture  65. 
37  Chigara (n 5) 113. 
38 Mogobe Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu (Mond Books, 1999). 
  
    There is another school of thought that rejects the continent wide application of norms like 
Ubuntu or Humwe. Vans Binsbergen for example expresses some scepticism on the continent-
wide application of concepts like Ubuntu. He argues that there is insufficient evidence to 
substantiate this claim.39 Similarly, Simiyu40 argues that African communitarianism is a 
Utopian ideal in light of the political realities of many post-colonial countries bedevilled with 
ethnic conflicts and poor governance. This position may hold true if  concepts like Ubuntu are 
simply confined to the notion of African communitarianism. This is not the case since these 
terms also connote 'personhood' and 'humanness'.41 
 
 State Recognition of African Social Ordering Grundnorms 
    Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on the continent wide use of indigenous social ordering 
norms, some African states have attempted to incorporate these rules within their constitutional 
framework. South Africa is a pertinent example of an APPA state that regards Ubuntu as a 
fundamental social ordering norm.  Constitutional recognition of this rule was provided within 
the transitional South African Constitution 1993. It is instructive that the final 1996 
Constitution did not follow suit. But the importance of this norm in the South African legal 
framework has been recognised by the South African courts. In the landmark South African 
constitutional court case of S v. Makwanyane,42 the South African Constitutional Court 
approved the constitutional importance of the indigenous Ubuntu norm. This case considered 
s.277 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 which provided for  the use of the death 
penalty. The court denounced the use of death penalty in the South African criminal law 
system. In framing its decision, the Court invoked the ontological concept of Ubuntu with its 
emphasis on the value of human life and dignity. It held that the death penalty could be 
characterised as ‘inhumane punishment’ since it deprived the convicted person of human 
dignity.  The Court further held that the continuing use of the death penalty was contrary to the 
constitutional focus on national unity and reconciliation which in a large part is premised on 
the norm of Ubuntu. The Court held: 
‘The notion of Ubuntu expressly provided for in the epilogue of the Constitution, the 
underlying idea and its accompanying values are also expressed in the preamble. These 
                                                 
39 Wim Van Binsbergen, Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological Lessons Towards a  
Philosophy of Interculturality (Munster: Lit Verlag 2003) Chapter 14.   
40 Simiyu, V. G., 1987, “The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies”, in Walter Oyugi and Afrifra 
Gitonga (eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa (Heinemann, 1987) 51-54. 
Chikosa Silungwe 'On African Legal Theory: A Possibility,  An Impossibility or Mere Conundrum' in Oche 
Onazi (ed) African Legal Theory and Constitutional  Problems: Critical Essays (Springer, 2014) 27. 
42 (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 
  
values underlie, first and foremost, the whole idea of adopting a Bill of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms in a new legal order. They are central to the coherence of all the 
rights entrenched in Chapter 3 - where the right to life and the right to respect for and 
protection of human dignity are embodied in Sections 9 and 10 respectively.’43 
     There are other judicial cases44 within the South African legal framework which provide 
similar recognition of the use of Ubuntu in the South African legal system. It is unclear if there 
is similar state practice in other African states. This does not however mean that customary 
rules do not play a role within the legal systems of these states. They however may not have 
the same relevance as Western received law especially with regard to commercial matters. 
   The article turns to the state practice of Nigeria, another APPA state example. Nigeria is a 
major oil producing state in the African sub-continent. Unlike the South African experience, 
the Nigerian legal system has not singled out a specific indigenous rule or norm that could  
serve as a guiding rule in the development of law. In allowing for the establishment of 
Customary and Sharia Courts of Appeal,45 the 1999 Nigerian Constitution does however 
recognise the role that customary law and Islamic law play in the Nigerian mixed legal system.  
    Comparative perspectives can be provided on why it may pose a challenge for Nigeria to 
single out one particular indigenous social norm to guide its legal system. First the Nigerian 
cultural milieu is different from South Africa. Unlike South Africa, Nigeria communal life  is  
not only governed by indigenous African rules but also by Shariah law. Second, Nigerian is 
much more ethnically diverse than South Africa and its customary law practices are not unified. 
The localisation of Nigerian customary law is confirmed in Section 258(1) of the Nigerian 
Evidence Act 2011.46 This section states that ‘a rule which, in a particular district has from 
long usage obtained the force of law.’ By confining the rule to a particular district, the Nigerian 
Evidence Act recognises how ethnically diverse the Nigerian state is. It will therefore be 
difficult to single out a particular customary rule of law as a basic grundnorm, except evidence 
can be properly shown that it transcends all districts in Nigeria. To establish this, native chiefs 
or other person who are recognised as have special knowledge of customary law will have to 
provide evidence that validates the validity of the custom.47 Some have pointed to certain 
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customary law rules in Nigeria that have ‘near universality of application.’ One such customary 
rule can be found in customary interstate succession where it is argued that widows have very 
limited capacity to inheritance.48  
    The localisation of customary law in Nigerian law may explain why it has limited or no 
application in the regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. But, this creates a conundrum 
in light of Ekeh’s ‘Two Publics’ theory. If as Ekeh argues that the ‘Primordial Public’ is more 
legitimised than the ‘Civic Public’ then surely the Nigerian legal framework should lend itself 
to the application of indigenous social grund-norms in the governance and regulation the Oil 
and Gas sector. This is necessary as oil producing communities bear the brunt of oil and gas 
exploitation that is undertaken in their territories. A key African 'social ordering' rule that is 
relevant to petroleum Governance is communal ownership of land (and its resources). 
African Ownership of Land and its Resources: Public or Communal Ownership  
     Ubuntu, Humwe and similar social ordering rules focus on inter-dependence, communality, 
fairness and humanness. These rules recognise the concept of communal ownership in land.49    
Following colonialization of Sub- Saharan Africa, attempts were made to replace the 
communal land ownership with the Native Land tenure system. This system disallowed 
Africans from purchasing property outside so called native land. In the Southern African 
region, the Native Land tenure system  was strictly enforced during the apartheid era and led 
to the dispossession of indigenous property rights in land.50 The Native Land tenure system 
resulted in the subjugation of customary rights in land and led to the introduction of the 
domanial system where rights in land were transferred to the colonial state.51 The Native Land 
tenure system in a warped  way preserved communal land, but at the same time denied 
indigenous communities the right to manage and control their lands and resources. This was 
done through the concept of trusteeship where the colonial state held customary land in trust 
for the indigenous population.52 
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     Independent African states have repealed these Native Land Tenure legislation, but some 
African states, including Nigeria have maintained the trusteeship concept of land. During the 
tenure of military governance, radical changes were made to the land tenure system through 
the enactment of the Land Use Act 1978.53  The Land Use Act vests all land in the states of the 
Federation of Nigeria to their respective state governors. These governors hold land in trust for 
the use and benefit of all Nigerians.  
    Unlike the Native Land Tenure system, the Land Use Act confers certain property rights to 
individual, families and communities. The rights are described as a statutory right of occupancy 
and the customary rights of occupancy respectively.54 The effect of the Land Use Act is to 
extinguish the pre-existing rights in land and replace them with limited rights similar to a 
leasehold.55  The trusteeship system of land set out in section 1 of the Land Use Act raises 
some interesting issues. This is because 'at the core of a trust concept is a duty of confidence 
imposed upon a trustee.'56 Further,  as stated by Lord Evershed MR, 'for a trust to be effective, 
it must have ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries.' 57 
   Section 1 of the Land Use Act identifies the ascertained beneficiaries of the trusteeship 
system developed by the Act. These beneficiaries are 'all Nigerian citizens.' The focus on 
citizenship (which is one of the key features of the Westphalian state system) and not on ethnic 
groups or indigenous peoples is connected with the public interest concern of fostering social 
cohesion and national development.58 But as Ekeh's 'Two Publics' model demonstrates,   the 
'Primordial Public' is viewed by some Africans as more important than the 'Civic Public.'59 The 
extinction of preexisting rights, and the replacement of such rights, with the limited rights' 
regime set out in the Act is seen as an attempt to prioritise the interests of the 'Civic Public' 
above those of the 'Primordial Public.' This creates a confidence gap which goes against the 
core of the trust concept which is predicated on the 'confidence imposed upon a trustee.' 60 
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    This has led to the call for the repeal or fundamental restructuring of the Land Use Act in 
certain quarters.61 It will be a difficult task to repeal or change this law.  This is because of the 
constitutional importance of the Land Use Act 1978. Section 315 (5) of the 1999 Constitution 
confers the Act with the same status as the provisions of the Constitution. It states that the Act 
cannot ‘be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9 (2) of this 
Constitution.’ 62This means that the Land Use Act 1978 cannot be repealed or altered except 
the proposal for repeal or amendment is supported by no lower than a two-third majority of the 
National Assembly and by no less than two-thirds of all the states of Nigeria. Notwithstanding 
the substantive changes that have been made by the Land Use Act, local communities still 
perceive indigenous land tenure as communal 
      The reforms to communal ownership is not only confined to the land tenure, it also applies 
to ownership of mineral resources. The Nigerian 1999 Constitution as the supreme national 
law confers ownership of the ‘entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and 
natural gas in under or upon land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone’63 to the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. Public ownership 
of petroleum resources is also re-affirmed in the Petroleum Act 1969 where the ‘entire 
ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to which this section applies 
shall be vested in the State.’64 
   The Constitution and the state legislation cited above shows that natural resources, inclusive 
of petroleum is owned by the Nigerian state and not oil producing communities. Since the 
Nigerian Constitution as the supreme law stipulates public ownership of petroleum resources, 
it may explain why social ordering indigenous rules play no apparent role in the regulation and 
management of the Nigerian Oil and Gas sector. Yet, the exploitation of these resources are 
undertaken in the communities that still subscribe to communal ownership of all resources.  
Recurring Resource Conflicts: The Tale of Two Publics 
This article has explained how ownership of communal land and natural resources has evolved 
from strict communal ownership to public ownership in some African countries. The land 
tenure system in Nigeria, an APPA state has been presented as a case study of the growing role 
of public ownership of land. The concluding section of this part considers whether the 
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prioritisation of public ownership over communal ownership creates a conflict between the two 
publics discussed in Ekeh's work? Oshio, in an early piece, 65 on the Land Use Act argues that 
Section 1 of the Act has borrowed from the indigenous system of communal ownership. He 
asserts that state governors hold a role similar to community or family head in that they hold 
land in trust for the people they govern. He further points out that while there may be some 
basis for this comparison between public ownership and communal ownership, the Land Use 
Act has created areas of conflict between these two systems of land tenure governance. These 
areas of conflict arise in the management and control of the land, particularly with regard, to 
the allocation to members of the community and the partition of the sale of land.   
      Another key area of conflict which Oshio’s article did not consider is the legitimisation 
process of the reforms initiated by the Land Use Act. As previously stated, the Land Use Act 
is a legacy of military governance which continues to enjoy constitutional protection under the 
Nigerian 1999 Constitution. Applying Ekeh’s ‘Two Publics’ model66, it could be argued that 
the continuing legitimisation of the Land Use Act by the 1999 Constitution has been undertaken 
within the 'Civic Public' and its institutions. It is therefore questionable whether the Land Use 
Act has received the same legitimisation process within the 'Primordial Public' where oil and 
gas exploitation takes place. The same concern applies to public ownership of the petroleum 
resources where oil producing communities continue to clamour for resource control.  
    This issue is important as it provides some explanation on why there are recurring resource 
conflicts in regions like the Niger Delta. This is because as Ekeh asserts the primordial public 
which consists of family, clan and community is more legitimised by ordinary Africans than 
the civic public which is premised on colonial structures and received law. Yet, as the studies67 
on Nigeria’s constitutional history show, the framing and development of the different Nigerian 
Constitutions and other state laws has been undertaken by institutions within the  'Civic Public' 
with little or no direct involvement by the 'Primordial Public' in the decision making process. 
This may explain why there is a sense of alienation within oil producing communities, 
regarding the transfer of ownership of natural resources, from communal ownership to public 
(state) ownership. It brings to light the ‘cultural conflict’ highlighted in Menski's work68 
between received law and indigenous law. Yet the reality of the post-colonial African 
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experience is that both sets of rules operate within most African pluralist systems. The real 
conflict stems from a hierarchized legal system which prioritises one set of rules above another 
instead of allowing for a co-existence of rules. 
  This is why the interim 1993 South African Constitution has been held up as a good example 
of how an indigenous social  ordering can be effectively incorporated into the supreme law of 
the land. Sadly, the 1996 final South African Constitution did not follow suit and failed to 
expressly enshrine Ubuntu in its text. There are concerns on why the 1996 final Constitution 
expressly failed to include Ubuntu within its framework. Mokgoro, a leading jurist and 
proponent of Ubuntu however argues that the fundamental values of the current South African 
Constitution coincides with 'some of the key values of ubuntu(ism) e.g. human dignity itself, 
respect, inclusivity, compassion, concern for others, honesty and conformity.'69  While this 
position may hold true to some extent, the non-inclusion of Ubuntu in the 1996 Constitution is 
a missed opportunity for the constitutional legitimisation of indigenous normative 
development.  It also means that the development of natural resources may not need to be based 
on indigenous normative obligations. Indeed all that the final 1996 Constitution requires is that 
natural resources should be developed in an ecologically sustainable manner. While this is a 
positive step, the control and management if mineral and petroleum resources still rests with 
the State as custodian.70  
        This again confirms the domanial nature of petroleum ownership and the continuing role 
that the international rule of permanent sovereignty over natural resources71 plays in petroleum 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the considered position is that the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources does not only apply only to states but to their 
peoples.72 It is therefore questionable why many African oil producing states in their municipal 
systems have adopted the narrow construction of this principle which confines sovereignty 
over natural resources to domanial state ownership. 
     This appears to be an unsatisfactory state of affairs considering that some African states 
have failed to manage natural resources for national development and for ‘the well-being of 
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the people of the State concerned.’73 How the ‘people of the State’ are to be defined is quite 
crucial to a further understanding of the continuing tension between the primordial and civic 
publics. The failure of African governments to equitably manage resources for the wellbeing 
of their peoples has created the growing sense of the delegitimisation of the 'Civic Public' 
within local communities. This is why some in the Niger Delta oil producing region have 
argued that the Nigerian state is an artificial creation which lacks true affinity with nations that 
exist within the Nigerian nation state.74 The argument that Nigeria is a nation state of nations 
alludes to a situation where communities identify more with the 'Primordial Public'  than the 
'Civic Public' as discussed in Ekeh’s work. Robinson75 describes this as putting ethnic identity 
above national identity. In the illuminating work ‘Oil, Democracy and the Promise of True 
Federalism’ the argument for focusing on ethnic identity above national identity is set out 
below: 
‘It would be foolhardy for somebody from the Niger Delta to hope that a Hausa-Fulani, 
or Yoruba or Igbo person at the helm of affairs at the federal level to take the issue of 
the latter’s development as serious developmental matter. What is the portion in the 
Niger Delta? Except of course for there to be peace enough for oil to flow for him to 
use in developing himself and his true God created nation.’76  
        This may explain why oil producing communities within the Niger Delta continue to 
canvass for true federalism. This will allow the communities to participate in the decision 
making process on how oil and gas resources extracted from their regions are developed and 
utilised. They view the current system which vests ownership of petroleum resource in the 
Federal Nigerian State as unsatisfactory as it permits the development of other regions of 
Nigeria at the expense of the Niger Delta region.77 The quest for true federalism will require 
significant reforms of the municipal petroleum laws. Any proposed reforms should also be 
undertaken at the continent wide level to facilitate a greater harmonisation of rules. It is q The 
APPA recently undertook a study on the possible standardisation of petroleum laws and 
contracts78. This has led to the debate on whether there is an African Lex Petrolea? The 
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following part of this article further debates this point and considers the role that African social 
ordering norms can play in the development of a continent wide Lex Petrolea. 
 
PART FOUR 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFRICAN LEX PETROLEA AND THE RELEVANCE 
OF INDIGENOUS SOCIAL ORDERING NORMS 
Conceptualising Lex Petrolea  
 Lex Petrolea is defined as ‘transnational customary law applied by tribunals and courts 
dealing with hydrocarbon-related disputes.’79 Like other systems of rules, Lex Petrolea has had 
to go through a legitimisation process. When the concept was first raised in the case of Kuwait 
v. Aminoil,80 the arbitral tribunal refused to accept Kuwait’s arguments that there was a 
customary body of rules known as Lex Petrolea specifically as it pertains to the valuation of 
damages. Since this arbitral decision, scholarly debate has arisen on whether Lex Petrolea can 
be considered as a sub-set of international law.81 Doak Bishop in his 1998 seminal work82 
debated whether Lex Petrolea had been developed from ‘the internationalisation of business 
practices, usages and customs of the members of the international petroleum industry or 
community.’83 He found that there was inconclusive state practice and opinio juris to justify 
the maturation of a sub-set of rules in international law known as Lex Petrolea.84 He however 
opined that Lex Petrolea had begun to crystallise even if it was yet to ‘coalesce into a hard 
system of black letter law.’85  
   Other works argue that Lex Petrolea falls within a branch of law known as international 
merchantile law or Lex Mercatoria.86 Lex Mercatoria is said to be derived from the ‘trade usage 
and practices of merchants.’87 The fact that Lex Mercatoria is developed by the practices of 
merchants implies that it is not state law neither can it be strictly defined within international 
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law. This is why some have argued that it is a third realm of law that exists independently 
outside international law and national law.88 Since Lex Petrolea is considered as part of Lex 
Mercatoria, it can be further argued that it is designed to serve the needs and aspirations of the 
business community.89 In this sense, the legitimacy of Lex Petrolea is presupposed by the 
international petroleum industry that it caters to. 90 The stakeholders within this industry consist 
of national oil companies (NOCs), large oil majors, independent companies and industry 
associations like the AIPN. The latter body is responsible for the negotiation and development 
of internationalised oil and gas contracts which set out the principles and norms of Lex 
Petrolea.  
  This however provides an incomplete picture on how Lex Petrolea is legitimised as a 
recognised field of law. Apart from its validation by the industry that it caters to, Childs  points 
to the role that arbitral awards have played in validating the existence of Lex Petrolea.91  He 
argues that these published awards have addressed a range of issues regarding the exploration 
and production of oil and gas resources and can be considered as creating ‘a lex petrolea’ or 
customary law comprising of legal rules adapted to the industry’s nature and specificities.92 It 
has be suggested that Lex Petrolea is further validated by petroleum development contracts.93 
Chief among these contracts are host state agreements (HSAs) or government contracts which 
are transacted between oil producing states and international oil companies (IOCs). While there 
is still some debate on the need to formulate a global host state model agreement, there is a 
school of thought that argues for the standardisation of terms ‘regardless of the identity of the 
host state.’94  
    National legislation has also contributed to the development of Lex Petrolea.  The 
development of the body of arbitral case law on oil and gas transactions is largely due to state 
nationalisation or expropriation of foreign investment in the oil and gas sector.95 These acts of 
expropriation and nationalisation are generally premised on the principle of permanent 
sovereignty which asserts domanial state control over the exploitation of petroleum resources. 
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This establishes that although Lex Petrolea is derived from the trade usage and practices of the 
international petroleum industry, it does not negate the role that state legislation has played in 
its development as a separate field of law. 
      One significant stakeholder that has been largely ignored in the debate on Lex Petrolea is 
the local or indigenous oil community.96 Yet, as this article argues, the local community bears 
the brunt of oil and gas exploitation. This raises an important question on why indigenous 
social ordering rules have not played a role in the formulation and further development of Lex 
Petrolea? 
 
Framing an African Lex Petrolea  
     A leading energy law firm, Ashurst97 has recently debated whether an African Lex Petrolea 
exists? This debate has arisen due to the comparative analysis of national legislation and host 
state contracts that is currently being undertaken by APPA states. The study is designed to 
identify the key principles, practices and trends that are apply to the African industry. It also 
seeks for the development of a model production sharing agreement (PSA).98 It is suggested 
that the development of these standardised rules and the model PSA could lead to the 
establishment of an African Lex Petrolea.99 It is questionable whether this comparative study 
undertaken by APPA states on the one hand and by ‘a consortium of international law firms 
and consultants,’100 on the other, will necessarily bring about the development of an African 
Lex Petrolea that will meet the needs of all stakeholders. It will appear that the APPA study as 
currently formulated is designed to cater for the needs of African National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) and International Oil Companies (IOCs). It does not appear that local oil communities 
are directly involve in its decision making process. The non-inclusivity of local community 
needs may mean that an ‘African Lex Petrolea’  solely developed from this APPA study will 
fail to make any meaningful impact in resolving resource conflicts between APPA states, 
MNCs and local communities. 
   Understanding that the oil and gas industry is prone to the risk of disputes, industry 
stakeholders have developed Lex Petrolea to assist in the resolution of such disputes. While 
these body of transnational rules have proved useful in the resolution of disputes between states 
and MNCs, the notion of Lex Petrolea as presently conceived is unlikely to play any major role 
in the resolution of current and emerging disputes between States (and MNCs)  and local 
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communities. This is because the norms that currently shape Lex Petrolea are primarily derived 
from Western received law and practices. 
         This article argues that there is a place to embed African social ordering norms which 
focus on communitarianism, human dignity and social justice in oil and gas dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The inclusion of these rules in the legal system of governance of oil and gas 
resources will help to de-escalate the tensions between the 'Civic Public'  represented by 
African State structures and the 'Primordial Public' represented by Oil and Gas producing 
communities.  
   A close appraisal of ongoing conflicts in regions like the Niger Delta establish that 
community agitations extend beyond environmental degradation of their land and resources.  
These conflicts focus more on the fundamental concern that the African civic state has failed 
in its ‘custodian’ role to properly utilise and administer petroleum resources derived from the 
local oil communities. These communities still value and hold on to the tenets of  fundamental 
African social ordering rules such as Ubuntu which are based on humaneness, fairness, social 
justice and sharing. There are variants of the Ubuntu principle which exist in the Niger Delta 
region, including the Ijaw concept ‘Kemesese-ebi’  (the common good of all).  This supports 
the arguments of Chigara 101 and Ramose102 that there is an underlining African social ordering 
norm that promotes social justice, fairness and communality. The overarching argument of this 
article is that there is a role that this underlining norm can play in promoting a more equitable 
framework of petroleum governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
       A call for the inclusion of this underlining African social ordering norm in Lex Petrolea 
and in Oil and Gas dispute resolution mechanisms may not be such a Utopian ideal. The recent 
edition of the  TDM journal shows that there is growing call for the inclusion of African 
indigenous rules in the arbitration of oil and gas disputes arising from Africa.103 This does not 
mean that these rules will necessarily gain the same status as the current Western rules that 
frame transnational petroleum law and national legislation. But the South African 1993  interim  
constitutional model demonstrates that it is possible to embed indigenous African rules within 
a civic public legal framework that focus on an African understanding of humaneness, social 
justice and communitarianism. However, the universalism and cultural relativism debate which 
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resonates in the Human Rights Law may have an impact on the development of an African Lex 
Petrolea. This is an important point that requires further deliberation. 
 
African Lex Petrolea: Unintended Consequences of Cultural and Ethnic Relativism 
    The call for the inclusion of African social ordering rules evokes the universalism and 
cultural relativism debate. This is a debate that continues to resonate in Human Rights Law. 
The debate is premised on the viewpoint that human rights are universal and do not require 
cultural validation.104 This is because human rights are premised on the inherent value of being 
human.  But Donnelly105 in his leading work points out, there are aspects of human nature that 
can be considered culturally relative. He therefore argues that some recognition should be given 
to the ‘crosscultural variations in human rights.’106 Conversely, those who argue against 
‘cultural variability’107 have based their arguments on the fact that cultural relativism can be 
used as a tool of oppression108 and for perpetuating repugnant norms and practices. They 
further argue that rights universalism ensures that all human beings are entitled to equal 
rights.109  
     A full discussion on the 'Human Rights’ Universalism and Cultural Relativism' debate is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it does shows the challenges that could arise if an African Lex 
Petrolea is shaped primarily on indigenous African social ordering norms. It raises the 
important concern on whether an African Lex Petrolea primarily based on indigenous social 
ordering norms can result in cultural and ethnic relativism respectively? Ethnic relativism, in 
particular, is a matter of concern as it focuses on the superiority of one ethnic group over 
another and delegitimises national hegemony and identity. 110 
    The example of the Niger Delta which is a current theatre of oil and gas resource conflicts 
demonstrates the dangers of a petroleum governance framework that perpetuates ethnic 
relativism and not national hegemony and identity. As previously stated, there is the continuing 
belief that wealth extracted from minerals within this region is being utilised by other ethnic 
groups within Nigeria to the detriment of the developmental needs of the groups within the 
Niger Delta. 111While it is important to promote true federalism which allows the component 
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units to exert greater control over the natural resources situated within their regions, this should 
not detract from the fundamental objective of the common national good.  
   It is debatable whether the underlining normative rule of Ubuntu and its different variants 
will perpetuate ethnic relativism. This is because the concept itself canvasses for 
interdependence and common humanity where all is done for the common good of all. 
Unfortunately, many African states which are obligated by their Constitutions and national 
laws to manage natural resources in trust for the common benefit of their citizens have failed 
to do so. This is why there is a need for the restructuring of the framework of petroleum 
governance which is currently premised on domanial state ownership. The inclusion of an 
underlining African social ordering norm which facilitates 'a bottom to top' approach which  
encourages local communities to participate in the decision making process may help to de-
escalate current volatilities within theatres of resource conflicts in the African sub-continent. 
 
PART FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The Sub-Saharan African continent is a key region for oil and gas exploitation. Yet 
some of its key petroleum basins are regarded as theatres of resource conflicts. These conflicts 
are partly due to dialectical conflicts between the 'Civic Public' and the 'Primordial Public'. 
This article argues that these conflicts can be deescalated through the development of an 
African Petrolea comprising of received Western law and practices and indigenous African 
social ordering norms. The current effort of the APPA states to develop standardised rules for 
the continent is a step in the right direction in ensuring effective governance of petroleum 
resources. The APPA study however has some shortcomings. This is because the study 
primarily caters to the needs of oil companies and African civic states. Yet as  Ekeh’s ‘Two 
Publics’ 112 demonstrates, many African communities operate within 'Two Publics'- the 'Civic 
Public' consisting of the state apparatus and institutions, and the 'Primordial Public' consisting 
of the family, community and ethnic groupings.  The article recommends for the development 
of an inclusive framework work of petroleum governance that is not only premised on dominos 
state ownership alone, but one that embodies the underlining African social ordering norm of 
social justice, fairness and inter-dependence. This norm is known by many names, the most 
popular description of the norm is the term 'Ubuntu.' 
This article however questions whether this norm has attained the status of grundnorm 
as argued in other literature.113. This is because the 'Civic Public' represented through the state 
                                                 
112 Ekeh (n 12). 
113Chigara (n 5) above. 
  
structure controls the legitimisation process of legal normative formation. The presupposition 
exercise for normative formation is premised on state sovereignty. formulated This has led to 
the establishment of a hierarchical system of legal governance where the  State Constitution is 
regarded as the supreme law of the land and embodying the grundnorm or fundamental rule.  
The 1993 interim or transitional Constitution of South Africa was presented as a bold 
attempt of an African state to incorporate the underlining basic African social ordering norm 
known as Ubuntu. Unfortunately this was not followed through in the final 1996 Constitution. 
This demonstrates the continuing application of the modernisation theory which requires 
Africa to continue to treat Western received law as its benchmark for development and 
modernisation, without equal regard to African social ordering norms. This article recommends 
further empirical study be undertaken by the APPA or similar bodies to ascertain the continent-
wide application of these norms and their relevance to the development of an inclusive 
framework of petroleum governance for all stakeholders in the Sub-Saharan African continent. 
 
 
 
